Wardstone

What do they actually do

Wardstone is developing satellites intended to carry kinetic interceptors to destroy missiles in flight, including hypersonic and ballistic threats, for the U.S. and allied governments. The company’s site describes a future constellation that would provide global coverage, with satellites handling tracking, guidance and engagement functions (Wardstone).

Wardstone appears to be at an early R&D stage (two-person founding team in YC F25) with no public launch records or customer announcements. Public materials do not list fielded systems or live services yet; work today is likely design, ground prototyping and government engagement to prepare for demo missions and procurement (Wardstone, Y Combinator).

Who are their target customer(s)

• U.S. national missile‑defense program offices (e.g., MDA, service leads): They need reliable intercept options against hypersonic and ballistic missiles and are constrained by gaps in sensor coverage and interceptor inventories; they require proven flight tests and integration evidence before funding new systems (Wardstone).
• Theater commanders and force protection planners (bases, fleets): They face short‑warning missile threats and must augment patchworks of ground/ship defenses that can be overwhelmed or lack full coverage; they need fast, integrated defensive options that work with existing C2 networks.
• Allied defense ministries near missile threats: They want credible defensive options that reduce dependence on single‑nation assets and can be coordinated with partners, but often lack budget or industrial base to build national space‑based interceptors.
• Defense acquisition/program managers: They must manage strict testing, certification, budgets and export rules; adopting a space‑based interceptor without demonstrated flight tests and clear integration paths is a major risk.
• Prime contractors and systems integrators: They need new capabilities that plug into command-and-control and logistics, and are wary of interoperability, sustainment burden, and supplier risk from very early‑stage vendors.

How would they acquire their first 10, 50, and 100 customers

• First 10: Run classified briefings and invite program offices and prime‑integration teams to ground HWIL and small in‑orbit tech demos; convert successful demos into funded prototypes or pilot agreements, ideally via co‑development or subcontracting with a prime to reduce procurement risk.
• First 50: Offer regional pilot deployments after validated demos (sensor links, C2 integration, a defensive satellite or hosted payload) plus training/logistics trials; pursue bilateral pilot buys and export‑authorized sales while signing regional prime partnerships to scale delivery.
• First 100: Transition pilots to multi‑year replenishment/coverage contracts (constellation capacity or annual blocks) with repeatable production, field‑support and certification processes; secure long‑term sustainment packages, spares pools, and shared operations centers to meet allied accreditation and export rules.

What is the rough total addressable market

Top-down context:

U.S. MDA’s FY25 request is about $10.4B across RDT&E, procurement and O&M, and broader DoD “missile defeat and defense” funding totals are on the order of the high‑tens of billions per year, setting the scale of relevant government spending (MDA FY25 Justification, Breaking Defense, Arms Control Center). Global integrated air & missile defense markets are sized in the tens of billions annually in industry research (MarketsandMarkets).

Bottom-up calculation:

Near‑term demo TAM: single technology‑demo tranches can be a few hundred million dollars (e.g., Space Force awarded ~$509.5M for six MEO missile‑tracking satellites) (SpaceNews). A regional operational buy with 20–50 satellites priced at ~$50–100M each implies ~$1–5B; higher‑complexity vehicles or interceptors push totals upward, as interceptor unit costs span ~$(4–6)M for PAC‑3 MSE and ~$10–30M+ for SM‑3 variants, with NGI procurement units estimated above $100M and average program cost per interceptor (including development) far higher (Reuters, Wikipedia, Arms Control Association).

Assumptions:

• Regional constellation requires tens of spacecraft for coverage; global persistence requires hundreds plus spares.
• Per‑satellite cost bands reflect military small/medium satellites with specialized payloads and integration needs; values will vary with interceptor mass and guidance complexity.
• Large procurement only follows credible in‑orbit demonstrations, C2 integration, and political acceptance; near‑term revenue is primarily R&D and prototype awards.

Who are some of their notable competitors

• Lockheed Martin: Prime positioning to integrate and field a layered U.S. homeland defense architecture and has publicly committed to space‑based interceptor demos by 2028; deep experience across C2BMC, Aegis/THAAD, and interceptor programs makes them a likely anchor integrator (Lockheed, The War Zone).
• Northrop Grumman: Developing the Glide Phase Interceptor for hypersonic defense and conducting ground testing tied to space‑based intercept concepts; major incumbent across missile defense and GBMD/NGI ecosystem (Northrop Grumman, DefenseScoop).
• Raytheon (RTX) – Missiles & Defense: Supplier and developer of exo‑atmospheric kill vehicles and seekers; a direct alternative or subsystem provider for any space‑based kinetic intercept concept (RTX/Raytheon).
• L3Harris: Building missile‑warning/tracking payloads and ground infrastructure (e.g., SDA Tracking Layer and HBTSS work) and expanding production capacity tied to homeland missile defense initiatives (L3Harris).
• Apex (startup): Planning a privately funded on‑orbit demonstration of space‑based interceptor hosting and deployment (Project Shadow) in 2026, similar in ambition and cadence to Wardstone’s stated direction (Air & Space Forces, SpaceNews).